This paper uses nationally representative linked workplace-employee data from the British 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey to examine the operation of shared capitalist forms of pay -profit-sharing and group pay for performance, employee share ownership, and stock options-and their link to productivity. It shows that shared capitalism has grown in the UK, as it has in the US; that different forms of shared capitalist pay complement each other and other labour practices in the sense that firms use them together more than they would if they chose modes of pay and work practices independently; and that workplaces switch among schemes frequently, which suggests that they have trouble optimizing and the transactions cost of switching are relatively low. Among the single schemes, share ownership has the clearest positive association with productivity, but its impact is largest when firms combine it with other forms of shared capitalist pay and modes of organization.
Introduction
There are three reasons for exploring the impact of shared capitalism -employee shared ownership, payment via stock options, profit sharing and related group incentive pay --on economic outcomes in the UK.
The first is that shared capitalism is widespread. Table 1 shows the incidence and coverage of the major shared capitalist modes of pay in Britain for private sector workplaces with 5 or more employees in the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey. Around one-fifth of workplaces had some form of employee share ownership scheme, which includes the Save as You Earn (SAYE) -an all-employee plan that gives workers tax breaks when they save to purchase their employer's shares but that does not require that they purchase the shares; the share incentive plan (SIP) -an all-employee scheme that offers tax breaks for employees holding shares in the company for which they work; and the Company Share Option Plan (CSOP) -where companies can grant chosen employees or directors up to £30,000 of tax and national insurance advantaged share options. The majority of the stock ownership plans are open to all non-managerial employees in part because the tax code usually requires such coverage to obtain tax breaks.
Turning to profit sharing and related group incentive pay, one-quarter of workplaces had some form of profit-related pay for non-managerial employees, and one-quarter had some form of group-based payment by results, which is akin to gain-sharing in the US. The vast majority of share ownership schemes and over two-thirds of profit-related pay schemes cover all non-managerial employees. The percentage of employees with these schemes exceeds the percentage of workplaces with the schemes because larger workplaces are more likely to choose to pay workers in these ways.
The fourth row in the table combines the three group-level performance pay methods into an additive scale that takes the value 0 if the firm has none of these methods, 1 if it has one, 2 if it has two, and 3 if it has all three methods. It shows that half the firms have at least one scheme and that 62% of workers are covered by at least one scheme. Shared capitalism is, from this metric, as much part and parcel of the British capitalist economy as it is of the American economy.
The last row of the table gives the proportion of workplaces and employees who receive variable pay as individuals either through pay for performance or through merit pay.
We treat these modes of payment separately because the "sharing" is related to individual performance as opposed to group performance and is thus more akin to piece rate pay than profit-sharing. 1 The second reason for examining shared capitalism in the UK is that the amount and nature of shared capitalist arrangements have changed over time. Profit-related pay and share-ownership schemes grew in the 1980s, spurred by government tax incentives. Data from Bryson, Pendleton, and Whitfield (2008, tables 5 and 6) on workplaces with 25 employees or more show that the proportion of private sector workplaces with some shared capitalist scheme increased from 40% in 1984 to 63% in 2004. The proportion of firms having profit-related pay increased from 19% to 44%, the proportion having group pay for performance increased from 15% to 25%, and the proportion having employee ownership increased from 22% to 28%.
The third reason is that the UK government has encouraged shared capitalist modes of pay with favorable tax treatment over time. In the 1980s the Conservative government gave tax advantages to profit-related pay. Since 1997 the Labour government has given tax advantages to share ownership schemes at the expense of profit-related pay schemes, which 1 Factor analyses of the five types of performance pay -individual payments-by-results, merit pay, group payments-by-results, share ownership and profit-related pay -identified two factors with eigen values above 1. Share ownership and profit-related pay load together, as do individual payments-by-results and merit pay. Group-level payments-by-results had a lower loading which was pretty similar across the two factors. became fully taxable. 2 Unlike the US, which gives tax breaks for collective ownership of shares through ESOPs, the UK gives breaks for individual share ownership. HM Revenue & Customs estimates that for 2002-2003 the Treasury spent about £800 million in tax relief per annum on these schemes (Oxera, 2007a, p. 3) . To see whether this is justifiable the Treasury commissioned an extensive econometric study of the impacts of shared capitalism on productivity (Oxera, 2007a (Oxera, , 2007b , whose findings we compare with ours shortly. We find that:
1) Different forms of shared capitalist pay complement each other in the sense that firms are more likely to have them in combinations than if they chose forms of pay independently.
2) Firms change modes of compensation frequently, with some adopting schemes and others eliminating them so that the gross changes in schemes are far more numerous than the net changes.
3) Shared capitalist pay is positively associated with other forms of pay and workplace arrangements: individual payment by results, employer reports of devolving decision-making to employees, using subjective appraisals of worker performance, monitoring of outputs, and reduced monitoring of workers.
4) Firms with shared capitalist pay, particularly with share ownership schemes, have higher labor productivity than firms without such forms of pay. The impacts of shared capitalism on productivity are larger when the firm combines several schemes.
Conceptual Issues
The traditional rationale for shared capitalist pay is that it aligns worker and employer objectives in maximizing output. To do this, shared capitalism must overcome free-rider problems associated with any group incentive system and deal with the fact that virtually any contingent pay, including piece rates for individuals, gives incentives for some forms of desirable behavior but not for other forms. 4 Principal/agent problems are ubiquitous in a world where contracts are necessarily incomplete.
Shared capitalism is normally associated with certain modes of work organization.
Since firms that pay workers on the basis of firm or group performance do so in the hope of inducing them to take actions that improve firm performance, they are also likely to empower workers to make decisions that affect performance, particularly where the employee has private information about the production process. Group incentive pay may also be used as an incentive for workers to share their knowledge about the production process with other workers and the employer (Levine and Tyson, 1990; Jones, 1987) .
By contrast, giving workers greater decision-making power absent financial incentives might adversely affect motivation (Ben-Avner and Jones, 1995): "they want me to 4 Annual profit-sharing bonuses may, for example, induce workers to try hard in the short run but to neglect activities that benefit the firm over a longer horizon. Worker ownership whose benefits do not reach workers until they retire may fail to induce workers to try hard in the present. Piece rates or tournaments can reduce cooperation and the sharing of knowledge at workplaces and even induce one worker to sabotage a rival. Daniel and Millward argue (1983: 205) : "Traditionally the purpose of PBR systems of pay has been to encourage workers to increase effort and output….In practice….there has been a tendency for PBR to become more an instrument of management control designed to ensure consistency of output." 6 Gallie et al. (1998) show that control of workers through close supervision, pay incentives and appraisal systems all grew in Britain in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 7 White et al. (2004: 100) estimated that in 2002 ICT-based monitoring systems were 'already covering around half the workforce and appear to be spreading rapidly'. Half of the workplaces with ICT monitoring were using it to evaluate individuals (op. cit., 96). some conditions, the two forms of pay may indeed be antithetical but under others individual pay for performance can complement group incentive pay. Consider a situation in which maximizing output and profits requires that workers do their own work and also help others.
In this case management will need two instruments to induce workers to spend some time working on their own and some time working cooperatively. Just as profit-seeking managements mix imperfect objective measures of performance with subjective evaluation (Baker, Gibbons, Murphy, 1994) , management could mix pay for individual performance and pay for group performance to induce workers to undertake both activities. Management could even use individual pay for performance as a tool against the temptation to free-ride on the group.
The most far-reaching hypothesis in recent analyses of the effect of human resource management on productivity and labor practices is the 'complementarities thesis' that advanced labor practices work most effectively when bundled together into a consistent highperformance workplace (Ichniowski et al, 1996; Pil and MacDuffie, 1996) . This hypothesis implies that firms should adopt shared capitalist modes of pay and complementary forms of work organization as a package rather than introducing them individually. Some analysts go further and link shared capitalism with the firm's competitive strategy (Huselid, 1995; Schuler and Jackson, 1987) . They argue that firms that compete on the basis of the quality of output should be more attuned to group incentives than firms that compete on the basis of low cost of generic output, where piece rates might be more effective.
We examine the notion that shared capitalist modes of pay and work organization has important complementarities in two ways. correct, shared capitalist practices X and Z will have greater effects on output when they operate together than when they operate separately. This implies that the regression coefficient on interaction terms such as their product XZ should be positive.
As with other production function models, without identifiably exogenous variation in input variables -in this case shared capitalist pay as well as capital and labor inputs -the regression results are best interpreted as reflecting associations among endogenous variables.
Depending on the heterogeneity among firms, moreover, the associations could be affected by selectivity and thus differ from the associations we would get from randomly assigning compensation and practices among firms. Still, our two-part analysis --looking for complementary links in the combinations of shared capitalist modes of pay and looking for such links in production functions --provides a stronger test of the hypothesized positive effect of shared capitalism on outputs than would analysis of either combinations or production functions separately. which is statistically significantly different from the 39% predicted from the independent hypothesis. Twenty-seven percent had one scheme compared to 43.5% predicted to have a single scheme; 17% of workplaces had two schemes, which is close to the 15.5% predicted to have two schemes, but 6.2% had all three schemes, which is over three times the 1.7%
Combinations of Practices
predicted to have three schemes. Thus, there were more workplaces at the extremes of the distribution than predicted -the sign of complementarity.
Using the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, which surveyed workplaces with 25 or more employees, we made similar computations for that year. These data show a pattern that is similar to that in 2004, albeit with much lower levels of the use of the various schemes. In 1984 59.5% of workplaces had no form of shared capitalist pay compared to a predicted level of 52.9%; 25.3% had one form of the pay compared to a predicted 36.6% whereas 13.7% had two such forms compared to a predicted 9.2% while 1.4% had three such forms compared to a predicted 0.7%. More workplaces had 2 or 3 forms of shared capitalist pay and more had 0 forms of shared capitalist pay than predicted. In sum, the calculations for 1984 as well as for 2004 reject the null hypothesis that workplaces select shared capitalist modes of compensation independently in favor of the complementary hypothesis.
Changes in Modes of Pay
The 2004 How should we interpret this huge difference between net and gross changes? One interpretation of the high amount of switching is that it reflects experimentation on the part of employers in search of the best arrangements. Another interpretation is that firms change practices because the optimal compensation system changes, perhaps because what matters to employers is the 'newness' of a scheme rather than the attributes of a particular payment method. Whichever interpretation is right, it would seem that these changes are not major overhauls in employer practices, implying that the treatments and the inputs required to maintain them are unlikely to be large -that is, switching costs are low.
To see how the shifts in programs among workplaces might work themselves out in the long run, we have applied Markov chain analysis to the 1998-2004 panel data.
Specifically we organized the data into transition matrices whose elements are the probabilities of moving from a given combination of practices to other combinations and, on the assumption that the transition probabilities are constant, estimated the equilibrium or steady state distribution of practices. Table 3 
Relation to Other Workplace Practices
To examine the relation between shared capitalism and other workplace policies and practices The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is merit pay, which is based on a subjective assessment of individual performance by a supervisor or manager. Again, there are indications of a positive association with share capitalism, but in this case it is confined to an association with profit-related pay.
Columns 5 and 6 measure employee autonomy in decision-making as reported by human resource managers in response to a question regarding "the extent to which you would say that individuals in the largest occupational group: have variety in their work, discretion over how they do their work, control over the pace at which they work, involvement in decisions over how their work is organized?" The responses have a four point scale ("a lot, some, a little, none"), from which we formed a summated rating that went from 0 ('none' on all four items) to 12 ('a lot' on all four items). 9 Ten per cent of workplaces scored less than 5 on this scale, 47 per cent scored 5-8 and 44 per cent scored 9 or more.
The regression coefficients show modestly greater autonomy for worker decisionmaking in the presence of shared capitalist pay than otherwise, with the primary impact coming through profit-related pay in column 5 and the combination of profit-related-pay and group payment for results in column 6. While it is dangerous to compare results from different surveys across countries, the link between shared capitalist pay and employee decision-making seems weaker in the UK than in the US.
10 9 Factor analysis of these items produces a single factor with an eigenvalue of 2.21 and a Cronbach alpha of 0.73, suggesting that the items are aspects of a single construct.
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As an alternative measure, we also examined employee responses to an analogous question: "In general, how much influence do you have over the following….What tasks you do in your job, the pace at which you work, how you do your work, the order in which you carry out tasks, the time you start or finish your working day?" with responses coded using an additive scale comparable to that used for employers. Because there were five questions the scale ran from (0, 15). This variable was unrelated to shared capitalist modes of pay. This variable is scaled from 0 to 3. The positive regression coefficient on the share ownership dummy variable in column 11 shows that workplaces with shared ownership modes of pay do more appraisal of employees than other workplaces. In column 12 the message is similar with large coefficients on the interaction relating to workplaces that have stock ownership and on the coefficient on the 'only share ownership' dummy variable.
The associations between shared capitalist compensation and the other policies and practices shown in these regressions do not tell us how management coordinates the various pay schemes to form a coherent working environment but they do support the notion that shared capitalist arrangements work best in conjunction with other innovations in the employment relationship consistent with the model we sketched out earlier.
Basic Productivity Relations

'Share ownership offers employees a real stake in their company…encourage(s) the new enterprise culture of team work in which everyone contributes and everyone benefits from success… Employee share ownership has a contribution to make towards increasing
Britain's productivity." (HM Treasury, 1998: 1-2) To see how shared capitalist modes of pay affect productivity we estimate production functions. We have three measures of productivity. The first measure is an index based on the responses of human resource managers to the question: 'Compared with other establishments in the same industry how would you assess your workplace's labor productivity?' Responses are ordered in a five-point scale from 'a lot better than average' to 'a lot below average'. Of the 1,512 human resource managers who answered this question in the 2004 WERS, 6% thought their workplace's productivity was either 'below' or 'a lot below average' 11 , 42% thought it was 'average', 42% thought it was 'better than average' and 10% described it as 'a lot above average'. Most British studies of the effect of modes of compensation on productivity have used questions of this form in their analyses.
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We supplement this measure with two accounting measures collected in the 2004 WERS by a Financial Performance Questionnaire: gross output per worker (the ratio of total value of sales of goods and services over the past year to total employment); and gross valueadded per worker (the ratio of total sales minus the total value of purchases of goods, materials and services divided by total employment). 13 These measures are correlated with one another at 0.39. But they are not correlated with manager reports of productivity relative to the industry average, suggesting that the financial performance questionnaire and human resource manager reports on productivity contain different information about the workplace.
Given these three measures, our first inclination was to give more weight to the accounting measures in our productivity analysis. The accounting measures underlie standard production function regressions and are more objective than the management reports. But we quickly learned that the accounting measures have problems. Only 47 percent of workplaces participating in WERS responded to the financial performance questions, and some responses were such large outliers that we dropped them from the analysis. 14 After trimming the top and bottom 2.5 percent of values, we had valid data for 586 workplaces for productivity measured as sales per employee and for 524 workplaces for productivity measured as value-added per employee. 15 This reduced our sample by about 12 Kersley et al. (2006: 287-289 ) compare alternative productivity measures. 13 The FPQ questionnaire is: www.wers2004.info/wers2004/crosssection.php#fpq. Chaplin et al. (2005) describe the data and administration of the questionnaire. 14 Most of the data relate to an accounting period ending in 2004, with some data relating to a period ending in 2003. Where data did not relate to a full calendar year we adjusted accordingly. 15 The estimation samples are a little lower because we dropped a few observations with missing dependent variables.
60%. We will give roughly equal weight to the three estimates in our assessment of the effects of shared capitalism on productivity. Table 5 gives the coefficients for the association between the three measures of productivity and the incidence and intensity of shared capitalist pay in terms of the proportion of workers covered. All models are run with sampling weights that are the inverse of the probability of sample selection. The weights for the models that use the financial performance questionnaire data also adjust for non-response, as described in Chaplin et al. (2005) . We use a robust estimator to account for heteroskedasticity. The coefficients in models (1) and (2) are from ordered probits for the subjective measure of labor productivity relative to the industry average. The coefficients in models (3) and (4) and in models (5) and (6) are from linear regression models for log sales per employee and log value added per employee, respectively.
The odd-numbered columns give the results for the incidence of shared capitalist forms of pay. They show share ownership schemes are positively associated with labor productivity on all three productivity measures while neither profit-related pay nor group pay for performance have any noticeable relation to productivity. The even-numbered columns
give the results when the measure of shared capitalist pay considers the coverage of the pay system -whether it includes all workers or just management and perhaps a select few others.
They show that the stock ownership schemes that enlist all employees raise productivity by all three of our measures, while schemes targeted at managers only are positively associated with sales per employee. Again, the other forms of shared capitalism have little relation to the measures of productivity.
Complementarity in Production
For our production function test of the complementarity of shared capitalist forms of pay, we regressed each of our measures of productivity on dummy variables for the seven independent categories in the Venn diagram. The calculations in Table 6 summarize the results. There is evidence for complementarity in the effects with each of the measures of productivity, but the particular mixture of pay systems that have the largest impact on productivity differs among the productivity measures.
In the regression for managers' perception of productivity the biggest impacts occur when workplaces have all three forms of pay, or have employee share ownership and profit related pay or employee ownership and group pay for benefits. This indicates that the positive impact of share ownership found in Table 5 occurs when share ownership is combined with profit-related pay or group pay for results.
By contrast, in the regression in which productivity is measured by sales per worker, the biggest impacts on productivity occur when workplaces have employee share ownership and profit related pay or employee ownership and group pay for results. Having share ownership by itself does better than having all the schemes together.
The interactions are weakest in the value added regression, with the biggest impacts occurring when workplaces combine employee share ownership with group pay for results followed by combining it with profit-related pay.
Finally, if we simplify the regressions by replacing the share ownership interactions with a single dummy identifying share ownership in combination with group payments-byresults and/or profit-related pay, the dummy is positive and significant for all three productivity measures, confirming that combinations of share capitalism systems which include share ownership are positively correlated with productivity, however we measure it.
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Comparison with Prior Literature and Oxera-Treasury
Our production function study follows a long line of UK analyses of the effects of shared capitalism. Many analysts have used earlier waves of the WERS to examine the effects of various forms of shared capitalism on manager reports of financial outcomes or labor productivity. Some have used surveys of particular sectors with quantitative measures of productivity such as sales or value added, often with in the order of 100 firms. Bryson and Freeman (2007) and Oxera in its analysis for the UK Treasury (Oxera, 2007, appendix 2) summarize this work. The two reviews show that the majority of studies find positive effects of shared capitalist pay on productivity or financial outcomes, while some find negligible effects and virtually none find negative effects. 17 They also find that the pay schemes that have positive effects vary across studies and sometimes within the same study depending on the measure of outcomes or data under analysis.
After we completed our research, the Treasury released a study that comes as close as we could imagine to giving a definitive analysis of the effects of tax-advantaged modes of shared capitalism on productivity. This study has the largest sample of any done in the UK -16,844 firms -obtained by matching HM Revenue & Customs' administrative data on Approved Profit Sharing systems, SAYE systems, and CSOP systems to measures of 16 The coefficients and t-statistics for share capitalist bundles incorporating share ownership are 0.492 (2.96) for managers' assessments of productivity, 0.444 (2.12) for sales per employee and 0.035 (2.10) for value added per employee. 17 A count of the studies in the Oxera report shows that ten of the thirteen that estimated the effects of profit-sharing found that it was associated with higher productivity while seven of the ten studies that examined share ownership found that it was associated with higher productivity.
productivity based on sales from the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) data set. In addition, the Oxera-Treasury study obtained measures of productivity for 7,633 companies based on value added from the Annual Respondents Database (ARD) provided by the Office of National Statistics. The Oxera-Treasury study covered enough years and firms to permit a panel analysis with fixed effects as well as cross section comparisons of firms with and without particular schemes.
The results of the Oxera-Treasury study confirm the finding in our study and in the bulk of the earlier literature that shared capitalism raises productivity. When the study measures output by sales (p iii) "on average, across the whole sample, the effect of taxadvantaged share schemes is significant and increases productivity by 2.5% in the long run".
It also finds important complementarities in the effects that are consistent with our results:
"there are further benefits to be gained from operating several types of schemes", with gains accruing primarily to companies that have both tax advantaged and not tax-advantaged schemes; and with large gains for the SAYE share ownership scheme.
With its large sample size and use of panel data as well as cross section data, the Oxera-Treasury analysis has arguably generated the strongest findings thus far on the effects of shared capitalism in the United Kingdom. Surprisingly perhaps given the sample size, the Oxera-Treasury study reports variation in results that resemble those in our study and others using smaller data sets: lower estimated productivity gains when output is measured with value added than with sales; different estimated effects across sectors; and different estimates of which schemes matter most when output is measured in value added than when output is measured in sales. The study notes that it lacks information on coverage of schemes or on other business practices of firms (as in the WERS) that could cast additional light on the impacts of the schemes.
Conclusion
In sum, shared capitalism has grown in the UK, as it has in the US; firms use various forms of shared capitalist pay together and often accompany them with other labor practices, consistent with the complementary hypothesis. But firms switch among schemes frequently, which suggests that they have trouble optimizing and that the transactions cost of switching are relatively low. Among the single schemes, share ownership has the clearest positive association with productivity, but its impact is largest when firms combine it with other forms of shared capitalist pay. Given that even the large sample Oxera-Treasury study finds sizable variation across groups, schemes, and measures of productivity, additional studies using administrative data or the richer but smaller WERS files are unlikely to greatly advance our knowledge of what makes shared capitalism work in the UK. To advance our knowledge further would seem to require studies that focus specifically on capitalist firms per the US NBER 14 firm study with questions and case analyses directed at particular hypotheses about their operation. Note: Due to rounding the rows of the transition matrix summed to 1.0001000 so we subtracted 0.0001 to ensure that they sum to unity.
Source: Tabulated from the 1998-2004 WERS panel data file on workplaces. here have variety in their work, discretion over how they do their work, control over the pace at which they work, involvement in decisions over how their work is organized?" The scale on the card was "a lot, some, a little, none". An additive scale was created running from 0 ('none' on all four items) to 12 ('a lot' on all four items). MON IN (0,4): additive scale for the monitoring of worker inputs , the workplace scoring a point when the quality of employees' work is monitored by supervisors, if some/all supervisors can dismiss employees for unsatisfactory performance, where 20%+ of employees are supervisors. A point is deducted if employees monitor the quality of their own work (co-monitoring). Finally a point is added to the scores so they range from 0,4 rather than -1,3. MON OUT (0,4) additive scale for monitoring outputs scoring a point when the quality of output is monitored through inspectors located elsewhere, through customer surveys, records of faults/complaints are kept, there are targets for productivity and records are kept. APPRAIS (0, 3) additive scale for appraisal systems scoring a point when all non-managerial staff are appraised, appraisals occur half-yearly or quarterly, and non-managerial pay is linked to performance appraisal.
(2) All models contain following controls: firm size (3 dummies); single-workplace organization (single dummy); industry (12 dummies); foreign owned (single dummy); workplace aged 25+ year (single dummy); recognises union for pay bargaining (2 dummies); largest occupational group (8 dummies); has many competitors (single dummy); product market is growing (single dummy). In addition the INDPBR models contain controls for monitoring inputs, outputs, appraisal and decision-making; the decision-making models contain controls for monitoring inputs and outputs and appraisals; and the monitoring and appraisal models contain controls for decision-making. Note: control variables are as per Table 4 except that the monitoring and appraisal variables were entered separately rather than additive scales and individual PBR and merit pay are included as controls. Note: Controls are as per Table 5 .
Appendix: Survey Questions Used to Derive Share Capitalism Variables
The share capitalism measures are derived from the following survey questions.
Payments-by-results (PBR)
"Do any of the employees in this establishment get paid by results or receive merit pay? On this card is an explanation of what we mean by payment by results and merit pay."
Card reads:
1. Payment by results 'Payment by results' includes any method of payment where he pay is determined by the amount done or its value, rather than just the number of hours worked. It includes commission, and bonuses that are determined by individual, establishment or organization productivity or performance. It does not include profit-related pay schemes.
Merit pay
'Merit pay' is related to a subjective assessment of individual performance by a supervisor or manager. "For what part of your organization is the amount of profit-related pay calculated….Workplace, Division/Subsidiary company, Organization as a whole?"
